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Introduction
Professional sports team doctors are routinely stretched in different directions. The
Hippocratic Oath tells them to do no harm, and the values that make up common medical ethics
prevail. The final decision is left to the patient; his records and medical needs are confidential,
and your only concern is the patient and getting him healthy. What if, instead of a hospital
signing your paychecks it’s the general manager of a professional sports team, who must answer
to an impatient owner, expecting results? And what if the media is constantly prying you for
information related to the team’s star player, and often the player himself has a monetary
incentive to return-to-play as fast as possible? This divergent incentive structure has always
fascinated me.
Some of the most pressing ethical issues surrounding team doctors are aspects of
confidentiality, informed consent, advertising, performance-enhancing drugs, genetic testing, and
perhaps the most talked about, return-to-play decisions (Testoni et al., 2013). The importance of
these issues is as important as the job itself. If it is determined that it is impossible for doctors to
maintain their medical integrity while working in the professional sports environment, the job
itself becomes an ethical compromise. Are you the athlete’s doctor or the team’s medical
manager? A private doctor hired by the player is bound by privacy laws and can use anonymity
to make objective medical decisions free from organizational pressure. The player may also feel
more comfortable talking about the severity of an injury knowing that the diagnosis will not
immediately affect their playing time. For many professional players playing on single-year
contracts, the outlook of their health is an especially important factor. Private doctors can also
provide valuable second opinions for players seeking additional advice about their injury. For
players, team doctors can provide comprehensive and consistent medical care. For players who
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move teams often, it can be difficult to find or pay for a private doctor, and team doctors provide
convenient and low-cost alternatives. It is also advantageous to use the team’s facilities for
rehabilitation and physical therapy. From a management perspective team doctors are invaluable.
It is commonly reported that in 2015 over $350 million was lost in player salaries due to injuries
alone. Having quality medical care is important for teams to manage their players and avoid lost
income. Having star players injured is bad for teams trying to fill their stadium seats. Another
advantage in using team doctors is that healthcare facilities often agree to reduce the costs of
medical care in exchange for exclusive sponsorships with their local sports team. For example,
New York University-Hospital for Joint Diseases pays the New York Mets more than one
million dollars each year for the rights to advertise as the exclusive healthcare provider for the
team. The hospital also receives free tickets to the game and advertising space at the stadium.
(Pennington, 2004). Private doctors can be problematic for teams. The privacy they afford
players can be off-putting to intermeddling managers, and by choosing a private doctor, a player
indicates his distrust in the team, which can often lead to problems with other teammates.
In this paper, I will be analyzing one specific area of sports medical ethics—the decision
made by doctors to clear a player to return to the active roster, which is known as the return-toplay (RTP) decision. RTP decisions are unique challenges for physicians. Team doctors not only
have a duty to their patient/athlete, but they also have a strong incentive for the team to succeed.
Pressure from the medical team, organization, and the athletes is placed on the medical team to
push the player back onto the field as quickly as possible. This dynamic is different from the
relationship between the doctor and his private practice or hospital. While doctors do have an
interest in keeping their private practices and hospitals financially stable, the incentive might
lead to over prescribing or too many procedures, whereas for team doctors the opposite effect is
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achieved. Team doctors have an incentive to perform surgeries that will benefit the player in the
short term but not necessarily over the long term. Over half of surveyed physicians cited
balancing the pressure to return athletes to play and the athlete’s health as the top ethical issue in
sports medicine (Testoni et al, 2013).
RTP decisions are at the epicenter of the ethical controversies surrounding team doctors.
The decisions they make to medically clear players place enormous pressure on the players to
compete whether healthy or not. Normally, this is not a problem from the players perspective.
Players want to perform their job and welcome getting cleared by the team doctor as a hurdle to
overcome. There are several factors that affect RTP decisions. According to the model presented
by Creighton et al., initially the players health status and recovery period is used to determine a
timeline. Then, the reinjury risk is evaluated using knowledge and data specific to that sport.
Finally, there are decision modifiers where circumstances such as timing or the personal drive
from the athlete are considered (2010).
While there are several factors that affect RTP decisions, the focus of this paper will be
on timing or, more specifically, the concept that doctors are under pressure to clear players
earlier than they normally would because of the standing or value of specific games within a
season. The effects of decision modifiers have not been studied in detail in the current literature.
One of the goals of this paper is to discuss the weight of timing as a decision modifier in RTPdecisions.
Recently, the case of Kevin Durant has brought new attention to the aspect of timing in
RTP decisions of team doctors. Durant is one of the most prodigious basketball players of the
last decade. He was drafted into the National Basketball Association (NBA) in 2007, stands six
feet ten inches tall and weighs 240 lbs. He is a ten-time all-star, most valuable player, and since
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joining his new team, the Golden State Warriors (Warriors), has won two NBA championships.
In May of 2019 he was expected to win his third. During the fifth game of the Western
conference semifinals against the Houston Rockets, Durant made a jump shot and landed
awkwardly on his right foot. He jogged up to the middle of the field before clutching his calf and
hobbling off the basketball court. An MRI scan later confirmed the diagnosis, a calf sprain
(McCauley, 2019).
Despite losing their star player, the Warriors defeated the Houston Rockets and
subsequently the Portland Trail Blazers to reach the NBA finals against the Toronto Raptors.
After the first four games of the seven-game series, the Warriors were down 3-1. Since the NBA
merger in 1976 only one team had ever successfully come back from a 3-1 deficit in the NBA
finals. Before the pivotal fifth game, Steve Kerr, head coach of the Warriors, said that Durant
was performing well in practice and stated simply, “He’s going to play” (NBA Twitter and
Media Reports, 2019). On June 10, Durant triumphantly took the floor. In the second quarter he
performed a spin move and landed abruptly on his right leg tearing his Achilles tendon. The
Warriors lost the series in six games.
In the wake of the injury, fingers pointed to the coaching staff, management and team
doctors. To what degree were they responsible for Durant’s injury? When asked about the
decision, the president of basketball operations, Bob Myers, said, “It was thorough and it was
experts with multiple MRIs and multiple doctors. He was cleared to play tonight. That was a
collaborative decision.” (Winfield, 2019). While the Warriors organization stated that their
decision was based on Durant’s performance in practice and the medical clearance from the team
doctors, there is little doubt that timing had an influence in their decision. If the Warriors had

TIMING IN RETURN-TO-PLAY DECISIONS

7

been ahead in the series 3-1 instead of a 3-1 deficit, would the Warriors organization have come
to the same conclusion?
Durant’s recent story highlights several ethical issues with RTP decision making. One
issue is the risk of reinjury versus timing. It was commonly thought that the only risk of reinjury
to Durant was another calf strain. Almost no one saw ahead of time that the weakness in his calf
would lead to an increase in pressure on the ligaments in his leg. While calf strains are relatively
common and not serious injuries, torn ligaments another category of injury. Tearing an Achilles
tendon, even with modern medicine will sit a player out for an entire season. For Durant, whose
contract was set to expire in the coming months, the RTP decision was more important than it
seemed. These types of decisions are explored in RTP-decision models but are not effective
when proper reinjury risk is not made apparent to the player.
A second ethical issue is the idea of protecting team assets. Would the Warriors have
played Durant differently if his contract did not expire after that season? This question presents a
new type of player-specific timing. The Warriors might have been incentivized to play Durant as
much as possible knowing that he might leave the organization after the NBA finals. While this
is plausible, the Warriors were the primary suitors for Durant and in a good position to land
Durant for a second contract before the injury happened. The controversy and lost championship
could have negatively impacted Durant’s perception of the organization and could have
ultimately led to his departing from the Warriors for the Brooklyn Nets in the off-season.
Timing, or in this case the proximity to the NBA finals, however, cannot be ignored as
one of the primary reasons for the decision to return Durant to play. If a star player is out during
one of the most important games of his career, timing is a powerful motivator to get that player
back on the basketball court.
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Literature Review
The following literature review provides ethical background information on the
shortcomings and challenges faced by team doctors. The review starts with ethics governing all
team doctors’ decisions and addresses the issues of autonomy, confidentiality, organizational
pressure, and RTP decision-making, and with respect to the issue of RTP decision-making,
timing.
The American Medical Association (AMA)’s code of medical ethics provides that
physicians have two responsibilities to athletes. First, physicians should “base their judgement
about an individual’s participation solely on medical considerations.” Second, physicians should
“not allow the desires of spectators, promoters…or even the injured individual to govern a
decision” (“Sports Medicine”). The International Federation of Sports Medicine (FIMS) was
established in 1928 after the first modern Olympic games and is the most relevant institution for
the care of international sports competitors. According to FIMS’s code of ethics, with respect to
RTP decisions, “the outcome of the competition must never influence such decisions” and “no
third party should influence these decisions” (“Code of Ethics”).
These ethical standards are important to understand as the foundation for ethical decisionmaking by team doctors. While an individual can claim to uphold the ethical values required by
their profession, using them in practice is different from a pragmatic viewpoint. Team doctors
are presented with ethical challenges, especially when faced with RTP decisions. The relevant
issues to the Kevin Durant case study and timing in general are explored below.
According to Testoni. who put together a comprehensive list of ethical issues in sports
medicine, it is first important to understand the role of doctors, and how the profession has
evolved in terms of patient autonomy and how the role of team doctor has evolved with it. Early

TIMING IN RETURN-TO-PLAY DECISIONS

9

in medicine, doctors adopted a paternalistic view toward their patients. The doctor was expected
to know and decide the best course of action for their patients, but in the late twentieth century,
ideas about medical autonomy shifted toward a patient-focused, decision-making process.
Doctors now are expected to present a series of plans to their patients and explain the risks and
benefits of each course of treatment. Sports team doctors, while still being subject to second
opinions and managerial oversight, are required to adopt a paternalistic view through the
oversight and influence of the sports organization (2013).
The sports team doctor’s decision is heavily weighed when determining if a player is
ready to play. Sports teams want to protect their players and are willing to prevent players from
seeing the floor if it could mean lost playing time in the future. The inherent problem of
autonomy with sports team doctors is that they are the decision maker that is responsible for the
career and future of their patient. Sports team doctors must prepare their patients for the action
that caused their injury. Doctors must also consider the personal incentives for athletes to play.
In the case of Durant, doctors were aware of the potential of his playing and winning his third
NBA championship and what that win would mean for his legacy in the basketball world.
While federal law protects patient confidentiality in most medical settings, team doctors
are agents of the professional sports team and are under contract to disclose relevant medical
information to the team. In a study performed by Waddington and Roderick, several team
doctors were interviewed in the Premier League, and among the team doctors in each soccer
club, there was no commonly held code of ethics governing the way in which they handle patient
confidentiality (2002). This report highlights that confidentiality and the way injures are reported
to the media vary widely from team to team. In a report by Anderson and Gerrard, New Zealand
Sports Doctors were surveyed on ethical issues in their field. Along similar lines, doctors
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reported that players will hide injuries so as not to have the information reach managers and
adversely affect their playing time (Anderson and Gerrard, 2005). In the case of Durant,
especially because of his highly publicized injury, he had an incentive to lie about how he was
recovering and how much pain he endured during the recovery process.
In the same report by Anderson and Gerrard, 100% of team doctors reported feeling
responsible for the player, whereas 70% indicated feeling responsible for the manager of the
team (2005). No case is more indicative of team pressure than that of Dr. Pappas and the Boston
Red Sox. Dr. Pappas had removed a portion of infielder Marty Barrett’s anterior cruciate
ligament (ACL). Dr. Pappas held a 5% stake in the Red Sox team and was made aware that the
Red Sox planned on trading Barrett. Acting in the best interests of the team, he downplayed
Barrett’s injury at a press conference saying that Barrett only suffered some torn cartilage
(Chicago Tribune, 2018). While all team doctors are not as incentivized as part-owner Dr.
Pappas, to lie, it serves as a reminder of how team doctors can become too entangled in the
success of their team that the success of their patients becomes secondary.
Athletes also fall victim to the organizational pressures. In an exposé piece about the
Warriors institution, Andre Iguodala tells of the institutional pressure he felt from his teammates
when he suffered a fractured femur that he claims was diagnosed by the organization as a thigh
bruise: “I’m fighting with the team, I’m fighting with people, I’m fighting with the media. Then
my teammates ask me every day, ‘How you feeling, how you feeling?’” (Botkin, 2019). The type
of pressure felt by Andre Iguodala is understandable in the highly competitive yet star-centric
NBA, where rosters are limited to twelve people and the specific physical gifts needed to play
basketball at the highest levels are only present in a small percentage of the population.
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Conversely, National Football League teams have a 53-man roster and often contain multiple
spots of the same position. Most NBA teams only have two per position.
According to the American College of Sports Medicine (ACSM), a three-step plan was
issued to help physicians decide on an appropriate RTP decision. Step one includes an evaluation
of health of the athlete from demographics, to diagnosis to history of injury. Step two includes
the risk involved with the specific athlete ranging from the type of sport, the position played, and
the competitive level of the athlete. Step three refers to the actual decision to clear a player and
include factors called decisional modifiers. The types of factors include external pressure from
the team or community, pressure from the athlete himself, and the timing of the return. The
ACSM asserts that there is less benefit for the athlete to return-to-play in the offseason as
opposed to the playoffs (Creighton et al., 2010). While the ACSM does list timing as a factor that
can contribute to RTP decisions, it is unclear how much that decision should be weighted. In
order to put a statistical backing to the current model of RTP decision-making, a statistical
review of time-off due to injuries was created to test the hypothesis that relative timing to the
playoffs affects how NBA team doctors assess time away from the court.
Hypothesis
While recent literature provides little data as how timing is weighted as a factor affecting
RTP decisions, the following hypothesis was derived from the recent literature, ethical trends in
sports medicine, and high-profile case studies. Timing, or in the NBA’s case, proximity to the
playoff games at the end of the season is an important incentive for each team. Team doctors,
depending on the standing of their team, are incentivized to return players early if it could mean
the difference between making the playoffs and ending the season early. This effect could
manifest in a reduced injury period for similar injuries when inflicted at the beginning of the
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season rather than the end of the season when games could matter more for playoff contention.
In order to test this hypothesis, the following study was performed to assess the impact of timing
on the length that players sat out due to injury. The following background information is
provided in order to understand the context of the study in the NBA.
Background Information
The NBA season consists of 82 games played each year between October and April. The
NBA is divided into two conferences, East and West. The conference standing of each team is
determined by the total number of games won. Each conference has fifteen teams and each team
is ranked 1-15 in each conference. The top eight teams in each conference at the end of the
season are designated as playoff teams.
While the individual needs for each team could not be uniformly compared, the relative
standing of each team can serve as a controlling factor for this study. High-ranking teams (1-5)
often either have their playoff spot locked up by the last month in the season or have so many
wins that even if they lose a considerably higher percentage of games at the end of the season,
they still will make the playoffs. There is little pressure for these high-ranking teams to perform
at the end of the season, and greater care is given to the players in May. Therefore, when a player
is injured, the player is rested for a long as needed to be ready for the playoffs. Conversely,
teams in the middle rankings (6-10) are fighting for playoff spots at the end of the season when
one or two wins could be the difference between making it to the playoffs. There is an added
incentive for these middle-ranking teams to perform at the end of the season. Low-ranking teams
(1-5) often participate in “tanking” when teams intentionally lose games to lower their standings
to obtain better picks in the NBA draft. Tanking is a pervasive problem in the NBA but is often
cited as one of the few ways small market teams can reliably build superstar talent on their
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rosters (Paxton, 2019). Like the high-ranking teams, these low-ranking these teams have little
incentive to have their injured players on the court. If this logic follows, the average rest time
given for each team type should rise or fall depending on their timing needs. This type of
analysis assumes that all players are equally important to winning on their team. This, of course,
is not true, but the value of an NBA player is increased when compared to other sports because
of the relatively small size of their team (12 players per team roster). One way to calculate the
individual impact of sports injuries to a team is to calculate the salary lost due to injury. A player
making four times the salary of another player should have an impact four times greater for their
team to win, while this analysis is not perfect, it does provide a way to calculate at least the
perceived value lost due to injury.
Calf sprains were chosen as a control injury because of their common occurrence in the
NBA, the relatively agreed-upon recovery time. According to Harvard Health, a muscle strain is
defined as a stretching or partial tearing of the muscle fibers. Strains vary in severity, but two
general types of strains are of interest. Grade I strains are the focus of the data. They are mild
strains where relatively few fibers are torn and require only seven to ten days to recover. The
muscle retains its strength but is painful. Grade II strains are move severe and require four to five
weeks to recover (Harvard Health, 2020). Calf sprains were also chosen because of the
ambiguity of player readiness. The only concern about playing on a sprained calf early is the risk
of reinjury as the muscle retains full strength.
Methods
Data was collected for each complete NBA season for the years 2014 through 2019 from
prosportstransactions.com. A search was performed to find each player placed on the inactive list
(IL) who suffered a mild calf sprain (recovery time <20 days). The NBA season was split into
three groups by standing in their respective conference. Teams that placed 1-5 were listed as

TIMING IN RETURN-TO-PLAY DECISIONS

14

High Position Teams. Teams that placed 6-10 were listed as Middle Position Teams, and teams
that placed 10-15 were listed as Low Position Teams. The average time for each player to be
released from the IL was calculated by month. The salary lost due to a injury was calculated by
dividing the yearly salary of the player by the days per year, then multiplying that number by the
days on the IL. If the hypothesis is correct, the average time for calf sprains to recover should
decrease as the end of the season approaches.
The data contains three sets of data. While statistical analysis is not ethical in nature, it
does provide valuable information as to whether the ethical guidelines are justified or whether
the analysis shows that certain factors supersede others when making RTP decisions. If timing is
a major factor in RTP decision-making, it can provide valuable information for players on what
kind of autonomy they must give up when joining a certain type of team. If it is found that a
middle position team rests their players less during the end of the season, free-agent players
could use this knowledge to decide if playing for the team is right for them or at least could use
this information as a factor when considering their future career.
Data and Results
The data is shown as follows: Figure 1 represents the total calf strain injuries in the NBA
from 2014 to 2019. Figure 2 shows the Low Position Teams (10-15), Figure 3 shows the Middle
Position Teams (6-10) and Figure 4 shows the High Position Teams (1-5). Figure 5 shows the
salary lost due to injury days for all teams. Figure 6 shows the salary lost due to injury days for
Low Position Teams. Figure 7 shows the salary lost due to injury days for Middle Position
Teams. Figure 8 shows the salary lost due to injury days for High Position teams, and Table 1
shows the results of liner regression in R^2 values for each graph. Table 2 shows the average
days and salary lost due to calf strain injuries.
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Figure 1: Total reported calf strain injuries 2014-2019.
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Figure 2: Total reported calf strain injuries for teams ranked 10-15 2014-2019.
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Middle Position Teams: Injury vs. Timing
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Figure 3: Total reported calf strain injuries for teams ranked 6-10 2014-2019.
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Figure 4: Total reported calf strain injuries for teams ranked 1-5 2014-2019.
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Figure 5: Salary lost due to calf strain injuries <$300,000 2014-2019
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Figure 6: Salary lost due to calf strain injuries for teams ranked 10-15 <$300,000 2014-2019
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Figure 7: Salary lost due to calf strain injuries for teams ranked 6-10 <$300,000 2014-2019
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Figure 8: Salary lost due to calf strain injuries for teams ranked 1-5 <$300,000 2014-2019
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Table 1: R^2 values for each team type
Team Type

Days on IL R^2

Salary Lost Due to Injury R^2

All Teams

0.0014

.0129

Low Position

0.2030

.038

Middle Position

0.0121

.2264

High Position

0.0821

.0366

Table 2: Average days and salary lost due to calf strain injuries 2014-2019
Average days lost due to injury

Average salary lost due to injury

All Teams

6.0

$96,832

High Position Teams

6.1

$78,170

Middle Position Teams

6.5

$125,602

Low Position Teams

4.9

$115,899
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The results from the data collected were not statistically significant. The R^2 values for
each of the graphs did not reach the mark of 0.7 for a strong correlation. The Low Position Team
graph had an R^2 value of .203 showing at best a weak correlation. One possible explanation is
the lack of data. While prosportstransactions.com has data for the NBA going back to 1979, the
details of the injuries are a modern phenomenon. Further back than 2010, injury reports are nondescript, simply listing a body part instead of a specific sports injury. For example, a data entry
from 2009 might simply list “calf” instead of specifying if the player’s calf is sprained, torn, or
bruised.
One startling revelation from the data is the sheer number of players who suffered from
calf strains who spent less than seven days recovering. Twenty-six of the forty-nine players with
calf strains returned to play in that short timeframe. While this may be attributed to the highquality care received by the players and their healthy diets, it is nonetheless impressive when
considering that most of those players were playing while experiencing high levels of pain. The
average rest time was 6.1 days, while the median was only 5.5 days.
Along the same lines, players are also incentivized not to report their injuries to the team
doctors, and there are many cases where no injury is specifically listed for a player to receive
multiple days on the IL. Deficiencies in reporting and transparency in each organization could
also have a strong impact on the data.
During the early months of October and November, all players with calf strains were
released within eight days. This most likely is attributable to the relative health of the players
during the beginning of the season as opposed to the long, exhausting middle of the season. It
could also support the timing hypothesis because each team is on equal footing during the
beginning of the season and has an equal opportunity to make the playoffs.
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For the data relating the salary lost due to injury, the data was more closely correlated but
not significant. The R^2 value for the middle position teams was .223, the highest of the group.
The other team types did not show a strong correlation to timing. The averages for each group
showed that while low position teams had the lowest average injury time, the perceived value of
that time lost was much greater than either the high or middle position teams. The low position
teams had 4.9 days lost per injury but averaged $115,899 per injury, while the high position
teams had an average of 6 days per injury but only cost the teams an average of $78,170.
Conclusions
The data presented cannot conclusively determine if timing is a major factor of RTP
decision-making. The statistical analysis did not show any linear trends of proximity to the
playoffs affecting injury time. As discussed in the data and results section, this could be due to
several factors. The lack of data points is staggering. Even in the modern NBA, players are still
placed on the IL list for unlisted reasons, and my suspicion is that there are many more calfsprain injuries than officially reported. While NBA teams have the right to move players to and
from their rosters at will, transparency remains a problem. One possible reason for the lack of
information is driven by media interest. Most sports reporters refrain from talking about the
mundane, management decisions of a team unless it directly involves a star player. The NBA is a
star-driven league, and there appears to be less interest in the bench player’s health and wellbeing. This conclusion is supported up by the data collected. The average salary for an NBA
player inflicted with a calf strain in the past five NBA seasons where it was specifically listed as
the reason for inactivity was $9,355,000 per year. The average salary for an NBA player in that
same time period was $6,400,000. The data collected shows that the teams feel more obligated to
explain why their higher-paid players are because of an injury. This makes sense from an
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organizational and media perspective. Fans pay to watch their favorite players compete, and
when that player is out because of an injury there is a greater incentive to justify why that player
is unable to play. Another shortcoming of transparency could manifest itself as a lack of injuries
when play matters most. From the literature presented earlier in the paper, athletes themselves
have a large incentive to keep playing during the pivotal moments in a season. For many, this
may include shrugging off nagging injuries and not reporting them to the team doctor. Especially
for injuries as minor as calf sprains where the physical strength of the muscle is not lost, the only
real symptom is pain. Professional athletes are expected to have a high tolerance for pain and to
put their own needs aside for the benefit of the team. This self-inflicted pressure could be one of
the reasons for the lack of data on this subject matter.
At least from the preliminary data analysis, the RTP decision is a multifactored decision
based on the competing needs of each party involved. The preliminary analysis of playoff
proximity is not enough to truly grasp the needs of each team. The scope of this study fails to
take specific instances of important matchups versus other playoff teams, long stretches of road
games, and back-to-back game scenarios. Each of these scenarios are other factors related to
timing that could affect the RTP decision process.
While the study controlled for physiological differences between players by using a
standardized injury, one factor that was not accounted for is repeated aggravation of the same
injury. Reinjury is one of the main risk factors associated with calf sprains. Several players listed
in the data had multiple calf strain injuries throughout the same year. Multiple calf strain injuries
suggest that the player might have a playstyle or anatomy particularly susceptible to calf strains.
This scenario could also inflate the total rest time data for each calf sprain because each time the
calf strain is reinjured, more time is needed for the injury to heal properly.
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One important factor that could affect the data is changes in policies made by the NBA
between the years 2014-2019. In 2014, the lowest ranking team in the league had a 25% chance
of receiving the number one overall pick in the NBA draft. This provided a great incentive to
tank or lose games at the end of the season. By 2019, however, the draft lottery system had gone
through several iterations so that the worst team in the NBA had only a 14% chance of receiving
the number one pick in the NBA draft. Yet another important change in recent years is due
entirely to sports betting. Before 2018, NBA teams had to turn in their active roster or the list of
players eligible to play in the game only ten minutes before the game. Because of this small
window of time, betting odds were swinging wildly in anticipation of who would be playing in
the game. To solve this problem, the NBA commissioner made a new rule declaring that teams
must submit an active roster 30 minutes prior to the game but allowing teams to change the
roster if a player is injured during pre-game warmups. The changing dynamic of the game and
even the active roster could have affected what is advantageous for teams and could have
affected the doctors RTP decisions as well.
One attempt to calculate player worth was by using their salary as a determining factor.
This calculation is not exact as only mature players in the league receive high dollar contracts
that are more reflective of their worth. Younger players receive standardized rookie contracts
that that set their salary based on their draft order. While I understand the hypocrisy of writing an
ethical analysis determining the worth of players by their salary, I believe it is justified in this
case. Organizations and the players’ agents negotiate salaries based on the market of that
player’s skillsets or the perceived value to their team. NBA contracts are fully guaranteed and
must be paid whether the player performs at the level of their salary or not. All of these factors
weigh into an NBA contract and provide a somewhat accurate picture of how many wins a player
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is worth. While salary lost did not have a strong correlation with timing, it did show a correlation
to the standing of the team. In general, it appears that teams who have less salary lost to injury
are more likely to be top position teams. This is expressed briefly in the data analysis section
when referring to Table 2. Logically, that the more salary a team realizes throughout the year, or
the less salary it loses to injury, the more minutes the team has to allocate to its best player, and,
therefore, the more games it will win. This correlation does not hold true for middle position
teams, however. Middle position teams had the highest amount of salary lost due to injury.
Arguably, the middle position teams could have been top position teams if it were not for the
large amount of injuries sustained. The health of the team is important especially in a sports
format with only twelve players on each team.
While the main ethical shortcomings discovered in the data analysis are related to
transparency, not timing, the impact of timing cannot be ignored as one of the foremost factors in
RTP decisions. While the data was not statistically significant, some parts of the data showed
weak trends for reduced rest time for players as the season progressed. While the definition of
timing for each team is different, there seems to be at least some trends to support that timing
during the season can influence how long players rest due to an injury. Case studies provide a
small amount of anecdotal proof, but to find the difference in statistical data may be too
complicated and individualistic to discern.
The case of Kevin Durant shows us that RTP decisions have a real impact on a player’s
future, career, and legacy. While no policies were changed and no blame was assigned for the
injury, it serves as a reminder of the complicated and intricate decisions that team doctors are
expected to make daily. While timing may not be the most important factor in RTP decisionmaking, case studies and testimonials show that it can be an exacerbating force when combined
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with organizational pressure, team pressure, and self-inflicted pressure. For professional sports
players, playing basketball is more than a hobby, it is a livelihood. It is part of who they are, and
no doctor wants to stand in the way of a player and their greatest moment. Even so, doctors are
held to an ethical standard that dictates they must act in the best interest of the player.
Professional sports organizations are to the same degree charged with not treating at their players
as a means to an end, but to take ethical responsibility for their wellbeing and try to do the best
they can for the players while balancing the pressures of winning games.
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